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ROSTKER V GOLDBERG: THE 
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
DOCTRINE IN MILITARY 
AFFAIRS 
It is only superficially problematic that a feminist should 
support military registration for women, because inherent in the 
call for equal rights is the acceptance of equal responsibilities. 
Historically, women have been placed in a contradictory and un-
tenable position, denied basic civil rights and "protected" from 
equally basic civic obligations. l Feminism requires the rejection 
of all such "protective" schemes. 
To military duty is attached symbolic as well as practical 
importance.- Male-only registration excludes women from what 
1. Women are both put on a .pedestal and deemed not fully developed. 
persons. They are idealized; their approval and admiration is sought; 
and they are at the same time regarded as less competent than men 
and less able to live fully developed, fully human lives-for that is 
what men do. 
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the TopiclJ, 
24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 589·90 (1977). 
"There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of 
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 
'romantic paternalism which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a 
cage." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). For a thorough discuaaion of 
the effects of protective legislation, particularly as to women and labor, see J. BABR, 
CHAINS OF PROTECTION (1978). 
2. "[EJquality for women is important for reasons beyond its practical conse· 
quences; it has symbolic importance because participation in the military life of a nation 
is a unique political responsibility." Goodman, Women, War, and Equality, 5 WOMEN'S 
RIGHTS L. REP. 243, 246·47 (1979). 
661 
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many consider the most basic of civic obligations,S subtly stig-
matizes women as to subsequent public service, political power 
and prestige,· and inevitably perpetuates anachronistic, stere-
otypical male and female roles. II 
The recent trend in the Supreme Court's equal protection 
analysis, particularly in the area of sex discrimination, en-
couraged some observers' to expect a ruling in Rostker v. 
Goldberg7 based on heightened scrutiny.· The Supreme Court, 
however, evaded any careful equal protection examination and 
focused instead on judicial deference to Congress in military 
affairs.' 
This Note examines the Court's refusal in Goldberg to apply 
3. R08tker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2662 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 126 
CONGo REc. 86530 (daily ed. June 10, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Kassebaum). 
4. Goodman, supra note 2, at 246-47. 
6. Id. at 263. "Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on 
the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing sexual stereotypes about the 
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection .... " Orr V. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268, 283 (1979). 
6. [S)hould Congress reinstitute a compulsory draft registration reo 
quirement using BeX as a proxy for an individual's capacity to dis· 
charge military duty, there can be no doubt that litigation would be 
brought and that the legislation would almost certainly be invali. 
dated as violative of the equal protection component of the fifth 
amendment. 
126 CONGo REC. S6548 (daily ed. June 10, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). Cf. Note, 
Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality of AU· Male Registration, 94 HARv. L. 
REV. 406, 423-25 (1980). Written prior to the Goldberg decision, the Note concludes that 
the Supreme Court ought to apply heightened scrutiny to Rostker V. Goldberg and ought 
not to defer to Congress because of the decision's broad public impact. 
7. Goldberg V. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1980) was the original suit filed 
in 1971 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs 
charged that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) violated Constitutional guaran· 
tees of due process, freedom of expression and assembly, laws against BeX discrimination, 
and aided in the furtherance of an unlawful war. 101 S. Ct. at 2650 n.2. The District 
Court disulissed the suit; the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, except for the 
discrimination claim, which was remanded. In 1974, the District Court declined to dis· 
miss the claim, although plaintiffs were no longer subject to registration, because plain· 
tiffs still had an affirmative obligation to register. The suit then lay dormant for five 
years. Id. at 2650. In July 1980, the District Court found the MSSA violated the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from 
requiring registration under it. 509 F. Supp. at 605-06. 
8. Craig V. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (heightened scrutiny established as appropri· 
ate level of review for gender·based discrimination suits). See infra notes 32-38 and ac· 
companying text. 
9. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-55. 
Women's Law Forum 
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heightened scrutinylO to a discriminatory statute. The Court 
never satisfactorily answered the constitutional challenge: 
Whether, under the equal protection component of the fifth 
amendment's due process clause, women as a class may be ex-
cluded from military registration.ll Further, this Note argues 
that the Court improperly and unnecessarily deferred to con-
gressional findings in ruling that Congress acted within its au-
thority by registering only men.ll 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
IN SEX DISCRIMINATION CHALLENGES 
Dissatisfied with equal protection analysis governed either 
by the permissive rational relation test or the rigid strict scru-
tiny standard, and sensing the nation's increased concern over 
sex discrimination," the Court first attacked gender-based dis-
crimination in Reed v. Reed.14 In Reed, the Court struck down 
an Idaho probate code provision 11 under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The provision mandated 
that of two equally situated family members contending for ad-
ministration of a will, the male would automatically be ap-
pointed. The Court held that although administrative conve-
nience was a rational state interest, Idaho's classification did not 
rationally further that goalie The Court emphasized the impor-
10. For a discussion of equal protection case law and development of analyses see L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNIITITUTlONAL LAw 1060-97 (1978). 
11. 509 F. Supp. at 596-97. The Diltrict Court carefully articulated the Goldberg 
issue: "It is not enough to show that [women'B) inclusion was needed; it would have to be 
shown that their exclusion was needed. . • . To Bummarize, we need only decide if there 
is a substantial relationship between the exclusion of women and the raising of effective 
armed forces." rd. 
12. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. 
13. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b), (c) (1976) (prohibiting 
any employer, labor union, or other organization subject to provisions of the Act from 
discriminating against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. I 206(d) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination by 
employers against employees on the basil of sex). 
14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
15. The Idsho Probate Code required that estate administration be granted in the 
following order: "(I) The surviving husband or wife or some competent person whom he 
or she may request to have appointed, (2) The children, (3) The father or mother .... " 
IDAHO PROBATB CODE' 15-312 (1972). 
16. 404 U.S. at 76. The Court recognized the state'B right to classify persons for 
different treatment under the law. However, persons otherwise similarly situated could 
not be treated differently for reasons totally unrelated to the purpose of a statute. rd. at 
75·76. 
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over 
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tance of equal treatment for persons similarly situated, thereby 
underlining a crucial element of traditional equal protection 
analysis. 17 
Several fifth amendment challenges followed. Frontiero v. 
Richardson challenged an Air Force policy which required 
spouses of female members to prove their financial dependence 
before receiving medical benefits and increased quarters al-
10wances.ls Relying on Reed, the Court held administrative con-
venience did not justify the different treatment of similarly situ-
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of 
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary 
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to 
the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the 
choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on 
the basis of sex. 
Id. at 76·77. Although Reed was a fourteenth amendment challenge, the analysis used by 
the Court became the analysis used in fifth amendment challenges as well .. The Court 
consistently has considered the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guarantees inter· 
changeable in sex discrimination suits. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 
(1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1972). See also, Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 
N.C.L. REv. 541, 555 (1977). For a discussion of these cases see infra notes 18·32 and 
accompanying text. 
17. J. NOWAk, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 520 (1978) ("Equal Pro· 
tection is the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and 
that people of different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same."). See 
Tussman & TenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIP. L. REV. 341 (1949) 
(the classic study of constitutional equal protection). 
18. 411 U.S. 677 (1972). 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
In this chapter, "dependent", with respect to 8 member of a 
uniformed service, means-· 
(1) his spouse; 
However, a person is not a dependent of a female member un· 
less he is in fact dependent on her for over one· half of hie 
support. 
10 U.S.C. § 1072 (2) (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
"Dependent", with respect to a member ... of a uniformed 
service, means-
(A) the wife; 
(C) the husband, if he is in fact dependent on the ... wife for 
over one·half of his support. 
Benefits would· be granted automatically to male service members regardless of the 
spouse's dependence. Appellants claimed that their rights were violated both procedur-
ally and substantively and sought a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the 
statutes. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678·79 (1972). 
Women's Law Forum 
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ated males and females19 and that the statutes violated the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment.so 
In Schlesinger v. Ballardll the Court took a turn by relying 
on the similarly situated principle when it found constitutional 
Navy statutes which allowed female officers longer tenure than 
males before facing discharge for failure to be promoted. The 
suit was brought by male naval officers, who argued they were 
unfairly burdened because they were discharged if they were 
passed over twice for promotion to lieutenant commander.1I Dis-
tinguishing Reed and Frontiero, the Court found the unequal 
treatment of men and women was the result of women's reduced 
19. 411 U.S. at 688-89. The plurality opinion stated that the Government had the 
burden to demonstrate that it is cheaper to grant benefits to all male members than to 
determine which male members are entitled and to grant increased benefits only to 
them. The Court noted that, if put to the test, many female "dependents" would not 
qualify for benefits. [d. at 689-90. 
20. [d. at 690-91. 
21. 419 U.S. 498 (1974). 
22. The relevant statute, 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in 
the grade of lieutenant, except an officer in the Nurse Corps, 
and each officer on the active list of the Marine Corps serving 
in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 
30 of the fiscal year in which he is considered as having failed 
of selection for promotion to the grade of lieutenant com-
mander or major for the second time. However, if he 80 re-
quests, he may be honorably discharged at any time during 
that fiscal year. 
(d) This section does not apply to women officers ap-
pointed under section 5590 of this title or to officers desig-
nated for limited duty. 
10 U.s.C. § 6401 (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
Each woman officer on the active list of the Navy, ap-
pointed under section 5590 of this title, who holds a perma-
nent appointment in the grade of lieutenant and each woman 
officer on the active list of the Marine Corps who holds a per-
manent appointment in the grade of captain shall be honora-
bly discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which-
(1) she is not on a promotion list; and 
(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned 
service in the Navy or in the Marine Corps. 
However, if she so requests, she may be honorably discharged 
at any time during that fiscal y~. 
The effect was that female officers had a thirteen year tenure before they were dis-
charged for want of promotion; male officers, however, could be passed over twice in 
fewer years. Lieutenant Ballard was not promoted for nine years. 419 U.S. at 499, 504-06. 
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opportunities in the Navy,28 not administrative convenience or 
"overbroad generalizations" about women's roles.u In effect, the 
Court upheld the statutes because they were designed to remedy 
sex discrimination. 
In Weinberger u. Wiesenfeld2& the Court overturned a So-
cial Security Act provision28 which awarded death benefits to 
widows, but not widowers, calling it "entirely irrational."n A 
unanimous Court found that women's financial contributions to 
family support were denigrated under the statute/'8 and that 
working men and women are similarly situated, thus equally eli-
gible for Social Security death benefits.28 The Court found the 
Social Security statute more pernicious than the dependency 
provision in Frontiero because the widower had no chance to 
23. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508. The Court's rationale raises its own ques-
tions as to job discrimination in the military. J. Goodman's article provides a discussion 
of women's unequal treatment in the military, focusing particularly on the effects of the 
combat exclusion on women's military careers. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 243. 
24. 419 U.S. at 508-10. 
25. 420 U.S. 636 (1974). Stephen Wiesenfeld challenged his exclusion from Social 
Security survivor's benefits for himself following the death of his wife, who had earned 
the principal family income during their marriage. Benefits were awarded to appellee's 
BOn but not to him because benefits were available only to women. Id. at 639-40. 
26. 420 U.S. at 653. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother ... of an 
individual who died a fully or currently insured individual, if 
such widow or surviving divorced mother-
(A) is not married, 
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit, 
(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled 
to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than three-
fourths of the primary insurance amount of such individual, 
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or 
was entitled to wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the 
wages and self-employment income of such individual for the 
month preceding the month in which he died, 
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a 
child of such individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit 
. . . shall . . . be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit for 
each month .... 
27. 420 U.S. at 651. The purpose of amended § 402(g) of the Social Security Act was 
to assure protection of the family. However, children of covered female workers were 
eligible for survivors' benefits only in limited circumstances, and no benefits were pro-
vided for husbands or widowers based on their wives' employment. Id. at 643-44. This 
was despite the clear legislative intent "to provide children deprived of one parent with 
the opportunity for the personal attention of the other." Id. at 648-49. 
28. Id. at 645 (Brennan, J.). 
29. Id. at 653. 
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prove support or dependence even though the benefits were 
based on the woman's employment.3o 
The Court found these "archaic and overbroad" presump-
tions at the root of Weinberger: (1) male workers' earnings are 
vital to family support, whereas women's are not,31 (2) women as 
a group prefer child care to employment, when given a choice, 
and (3) men who raise children alone prefer work to child 
rearing.slI 
Despite some uncertainty as to the appropriate degree of ju-
dicial scrutiny, the above cases at least evinced a developing ra-
tionale as to sex discrimination analysis: Administrative incon-
venience and overbroad or archaic generalizations regarding 
roles of women would no longer withstand an equal protection 
challenge. 
Craig v. Boren33 provided the turning point in gender-based 
equal protection analysis, because it articulated (but did not for-
mally adopt) a heightened level of scrutinyM by requiring that 
any gender-based classification serve an important governmental 
purpose and be substantially related to the achievement of that 
30. Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family the same protec-
tion which a similarly situated male worker would have received, 
but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order 
to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to 
others. 
rd. at 645. The statute's "effect was to discriminate among surviving children on the 
basis of the sex of the surviving parent." rd. at 651. 
31. rd. at 643. 
32. rd. at 652-53. 
33. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). A fourteenth amendment case, Craig u. Boren involved the 
constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males 
under 21 years and females under 18 years. Craig, a male between the ages of 18 and 20, 
and Whitener, a licensed vendor of beer, brought the action, charging that males be-
tween 18 and 20 years were denied equal protection of the law. 
34. In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens argued the invalidity of gender-based 
classifications by quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.: 
[Sjince sex, like race and r.ational origin, is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the 
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a par-
ticular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some re-
lationship to individual responsibility .... 
429 U.S. at 212 n.2 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 
(1972)). 
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purpose. III 
The Oklahoma statute in Craig burdened males rather than 
females. Nevertheless, the Court carefully scrutinized the record 
and took exception to the state's use of statistics as verification 
of the statute's rationale that teenage boys are more likely to 
drink and drive than are teenage girls:3e "Proving broad socio-
logical propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one 
that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that 
underlies the Equal Protection Clause."37 The Court found in-
consistencies and irrelevancies in the studies and found that the 
statistics provided no showing that sexual classification repre-
sented a valid substitute for other methods of regulating drink-
ing and driving. The Court concluded that traffic safety 
(Oklahoma's state interest) and gender were tenuously con-
nected at best, and that the classification constituted an invidi-
ous discrimination against young men between the ages of eigh-
teen and twenty." 
By specifically relying on Reed and its progeny, Craig v. Bo-
ren synthesized the new equal protection analysis of the preced-
ing five years and again rejected administrative convenience, 
archaic or overbroad generalizations about men and women, and 
outdated notions of women's place in the home rather than the 
"marketplace" or the "world of ideas"3e as bases for gender-
based classifications. 
Following Craig. a series of sex-discrimination cases came 
before the Supreme Court in which the court consistently ap-
plied heightened scrutiny, even if the statutes were not always 
35. 429 U.S. at 197. 
36. Id. at 200-01. The studies showed that although arrests of men ages 18-20 for 
drinking and driving significantly exceeded arrests of women the same age, the Court 
found the evidence unpersuasive because the disparity increased at later ages. Id. at 200 
n.8. Furthermore, random roadside surveys conducted in 1972 and 1973 indicated that as 
males grew older their drinking before driving increased somewhat, while females drink-
ing levels remained generally constant. This statistic added nothing to the state's argu-
ment that a gender line among teenagers advanced the state's interest of traffic safety. 
Id. at 203 n.16. 
37. 429 U.S. at 204. 
38.1d. 
39. Id. at 198-99. 
Women's Law Forum 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/5
1982] ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG 669 
struck down.40 In Califano v. Goldfarb,41 the Court found an old 
age benefits scheme, which provided that widowers were ineligi-
ble to receive benefits unless they could show prior dependency 
of at least fifty per cent upon their deceased wives, to be a viola-
tion of the fifth amendment due process clause. 
The Court analyzed the legislative history which showed 
that the statute's drafters presumed a man generally responsible 
for the support of his family48 and compared it to the presump-
tions in Weinberger. 48 The Court found that, whatever the valid-
ity of the law's original assumptions, a gender-based classifica-
tion could no longer suffice because it unfairly disadvantaged 
males by discriminating against the survivors of female contrib-
utors." As in Weinberger, women's contributions to family sup-
port were denigrated by the legislative scheme411 which rested on 
archaic and overbroad generalizations.48 
During the same term, in Califano v. Webster, the Court 
again applied heightened scrutiny and upheld section 215 of the 
Social Security Act.47 A unanimous Court held the statute had 
40. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981) (striking down on fourteenth 
amendment grounds Louisiana statute giving husband unilateral right to dispose of 
jointly owned propertY)i Wengler v. Druggist's Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (strik· 
ing down Missouri statute denying death benefits to widowers unable to prove physical 
or mental incapacitation as a violation of fourteenth amendment equal protection)i 
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding remedial provision of Social Secur· 
ity Act because purpose was to reduce economic disparity between men and women); 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976) (old age benefits statute requiring men to prove 
financial dependence of at least 50% struck down under the fifth amendment). 
41. 430 U.S. at 202 (1976). C/. Wengler v. Druggist's Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. at 143 
(1980). 
42. 430 U.S. at 215. See HOSKINS & BIXBY, WOMEN & SOCIAL SECURITY: LAW AND 
POLICY IN FIVE COUNTRIES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH REPORT No. 42, 
at 77 (1973). The original social policy behind the Social Security Act was to benefit the 
persons who suffered at the wage earner's death, namely the wage eamer's dependents. 
Therefore, dependency, not need, was the criterion for inclusion. 430 U.S. at 213·14. In 
1950, the benefits changed, and there is no evidence that Congress intended different 
treatment for the benefit of non-dependent wives. ld. at 216. Assumptions about support 
and dependency, however, cannot justify sex-based discrimination in the distribution of 
employment-related benefits. ld. at 217. 
43. 420 U.S. at 643. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
44. 430 U.S. at 208. 
45. ld. at 206. 
46. Id. at 211. 
47. 430 U.S. 313,316 (1976). Before it was amended in 1972, the section provided in 
pertinent part: 
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the number of an individ-
9
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an important governmental purpose: reducing the economic dis-
parity between men and women caused by this country's long 
history of sex discrimination.48 The statute established different 
methods of computing elapsed years of employment, thereby 
slightly advantaging retired female workers in their monthly 
benefit.48 
Referring to Ballard, the Court found that this favorable 
treatment of women was not based on archaic notions of wo-
men,IiO nor was it "protective" legislation. Significantly, the stat-
ute's purpose was to reinedy past discrimination by integrating 
women into the "marketplace."II. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The statute challenged in Goldberg was the 1948 Military 
Selective Service Act (MSSA),III which provided for the achieve-
ment and maintenance of an adequate armed strength to insure 
the nation's security. iii Included in the MSSA was a section re-
uaI's elapsed years is the number of calendar y8AJ'll after 1950 
. . . and before-(A) in the case of a WOmaD, the year in which 
she died, or if it occuned earlier but after 1960, the year in 
which she attained age 62. 
(C) in the case of a man who has not died, the year occurring 
after 1960 in which he attained (or would attain) llie 65. 
42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (amended 1972). 
48. 430 U.S. at 317 .. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (State tax law 
discriminated in favor of women; however, c1aaaification was not arbitrary because stat-
ute advanced social policy of cushioning financial impact of 8pousal loss on persons par-
ticulerly burdened.). 
49. 430 U.S. at 314-16. "Whether from overt diacrimination or from the socialization 
process of a male-dominated culture, the job merket is inh08pitable to the woman seek-
ing any but the lowest paid jobs." rd. at 318. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974). 
Therefore, allowing women to eliminate extra low-earning y8AJ'll from their calculations 
for social security benefits directly remedies years of diacrimination. 430 U.S. at 318. 
SO. 430 U.S. at 317. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1974) (Naval male 
and female line officers are not similarly situated; hence, different treatment does not 
reflect archaic and overbroad generalizations.). 
51. Ct. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (Utall statute establishing child sup-
port requirements based on gender of child struck down for ita effect of perpetuating 
role-typing and limiting options for female children). 
52. M.S.S.A., ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-
473 (1981». 
53. 50 U.S.C. App. § 451(b) (1981). 
The CongreBB further declares that in a free lOCiety the obliga-
tions and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the re-
serve components thereofshould be shared generally, in accor-
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QUIrIng registration of men between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-six.1W Registration procedures, however, were revoked by 
President Ford in March 1975 who intended to revise them.1I& 
In response to the Soviet armed invasion of Mghanistan, 
President Carter announced in his 1980 State of the Union Ad-
dress the necessity of reinstituting military registration." As an 
integral part of renewed registration, President Carter recom-
mended that the MSSA be modified to include women.87 
Congress conducted hearings, inviting testimony from mili-
tary commanders and Department of Defense representatives." 
During those hearings the registration of women was debated at 
length, resulting in persuasive testimony from both military and 
administrative witnesses that: (1) there were no administrative 
dance with a system of selection which is fair and just, and 
which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective na· 
tional economy. 
50 U.S.C. App. § 451(c) (1981). 
54. 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 provides in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this title . . ., it shall be the 
duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every 
other male person residing in the United States, who, on the 
day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, 
is between the ages of eighteen and twenty·six, to present 
himself for and submit to registration at such time or times 
and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be deter· 
mined by proclamation of the President and by rules and reg· 
ulations prescribed hereunder. 
55. Proclamation No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975), which provided in pertinent 
part: "[I)n order to evaluate an annual registration system, existing procedures are being 
terminated and will be replaced by new procedures which will provide for periodic 
registration. " 
The result was the highly controversial All·Volunteer Army. By 1979, Congress and 
the military expressed substantial doubt that the country's security needs were ade· 
quately met by the system. Complaints included increased "difficulty in recruiting suffi· 
cient manpower to meet active duty levels," substantial deficiency in numbers of the 
Selected Reserve-the units which would augment active military forces in a time of 
mobilization-and critical shortages of doctors and other skilled personnel. S. REP. No. 
96-197, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1820-21. 
56. 16 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980). 
57. PRES. RECOMMENDATIONS POR SELECTIVE SUVJCE REpORM-A REPORT TO CON· 
GRESS PREPARED PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 96-107 (Feb. 11, 1980). 
58. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981: 
Hearings on S. 2294 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
1678 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2294). 
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obstacles to registering women as well as men,09 (2) even in a 
time of mobilization women would be useful and necessary for 
support functions,80 (3) studies showed women's performance in 
the military is high, including under tested field conditions with 
sexually mixed units,8} (4) in some areas of the military women 
perform with skill superior to men,82 and (5) women would pro-
vide a valuable addition to the national registration poo1.8S 
59. 409 F. Supp. at 599 n.18 (quoting deposition of Bernard R08tker, Director of 
Selective Service System (May 1,3, 1980». 
60. Id. at 600-02. Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Pirie projected that by 
1985,250,000 women will be on active duty in the military. If there were a mobilization, 
80,000 additional women could be used. Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 58 (testimony 
of Robert B. Pirie, Jr.) (March 5, 1980). 
During the Korean War, the Department of Defense unsuccessfully attempted to 
recruit 100,000 women to meet personnel needs. 509 F. Supp. at 600 n.22 (citing U.S. 
DRP'" 0' DE'ENSE, BACKGROUND STUDy-USE 0' WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 3 (2d ed. 
1978». Therefore, if mobilization were to occur, the Department of Defense could not 
rely on filling all of its support jobs with women volunteers. 509 F. Supp. at 600 n.22. 
61. 509 F. Supp. at 604 n.30. "The performance of women in our Armed Forces 
today strongly supports the conclusion that many of the best Qualified people for some 
military jobs in the 18-26 age category will be women. The Administration strongly be-
lieves they should be available for services in the jobs they can do." Hearings on S. 2294, 
supra note 58 (testimony of Robert B. Pirie, Jr.) (March 5, 1980). See Owens v. Brown, 
455 F. Supp. 291, 295 (D.D.C. 1978) (No Navy report evaluating male and female capa-
bilities has revealed that women lack the native ability to perform competently in posi-
tions now held only by men). Another report found: "Our experience with the enlisted 
women has been very good. The quality is high; the performance is high; the capabilities 
are outstanding." Goodman, supra note 2, at 255-56 n.114. See also Hearings on Mili-
tary Posture and H.R. 10929 and H.R. 7431 Before the House Comm. on Armed Ser-
uices. 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 1179-88 (1978). For a discussion of military exercises con-
ducted in 1977 and 1978 to study women's performance in mixed units under field 
conditions, see Goodman, supra note 2, at 257; 126 CONGo REc. S6548 (daily ed. June 10, 
1981) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). 
62. 101 St. Ct. at 2665 n.8 (Marshall, J. dissenting). According to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee: 
(Bjasically the evidence has come before this committee that 
participation of women in the All Volunteer Force has worked 
well, has been praised by every military officer who has testi-
fied before the committee, and that the jobs are being per-
formed with the same, if not in some cases, with superior skill. 
Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 58, at 1678 (remarks of Sen. Cohen). 
63. 509 F. Supp. at 600 n.20 ("The current uniform opinion of the armed services 
and Department of Defense is that women inductees could be utilized, and that it would 
be valuable to include women in the pool of registrants available for the draft."). "The 
representatives of the various armed services all testified that they would have no objec-
tion to the registration of women." Id. at 603 n.30. During the Senate debate, some sena-
tors spoke enthusiastically about women's role in the military. For example: 
Let me begin by saying that there is a clear military justifica-
tion to register women. I have had an opportunity to study the 
role women now play in our military forces, and I have been 
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Underlying the Administration's recommendation to include 
women in any registration scheme was its conviction that equity 
demanded universal registration." A Defense Department wit-
ness testified: 
The President's decision to ask for authority to 
register women is based on equity. It is a recogni-
tion of the reality that both men and women are 
working members of our society and confirms 
what is already obvious throughout our soci-
ety-that women are now providing all types of 
skills in every profession. The military is no ex-
ception. Since women have proven that they can 
serve successfully as volunteers in the Armed 
Forces, equity suggests that they be liable to serve 
as draftees if conscription is reinstituted. II 
Despite persuasive evidence from the Administration and 
impressed by it, and let me spell out those conclusions that I 
have reached 88 a result of this study. 
First, women in noncombat positions have made signifi-
cant contributions to the military . . . . 
Second, in the event of mobilization there will be a mili-
tary role for an increased number of women . • . . 
The Manpower Subcommittee has also had the opportu-
nity to study the Maxivac and the Kostker reports which indi-
cate that the Armed Forces could absorb up to a 35-percent 
female base without in any way interfering with combat 
readiness. 
So while there may not be a military need for women, 
there is a significant military justification for using them in a 
period of mobilization. 
126 CONGo REc. S6536 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Cohen). 
64. Kostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. at 2659. 
65. 509 F. Supp. at 605 n.31. Proposed Reinstitution of MSSA: Heari1ll' Before the 
Subcomm. on Mil. Personnel of the Armed Services Comm. of the House of Representa-
tive., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (March 5, 1980) (statement of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics). 
By "considerations of equity", the military experts acknowl-
edged that female conscripts can perform 88 well 88 male con-
scripts in certain positions, and that there is therefore no rea-
son why one group should be totally excluded from 
registration and a draft. Thus what the majority t!O blithely 
dismisses 88 "equity" is nothing less than the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws which "re-
quires that Congress treat similarly situated persons 
similarly. " 
101 S. Ct. at 2671 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the military that women would enhance the armed forces, Con-
gress virtually ignored both the factual testimony and the equal 
protection policy and voted to exclude women from 
registration. ee 
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2649. Included in the Joint Resolution passed by the House on 
April 22, 1980 and by the Senate on June 12, 1980, were the following specific findings: 
(1) Article I, section 8 of the Constitution commits exclusively 
to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, pro-
vide and maintain a Navy, and makes rules for Government 
and regulation of the land and naval forces, and pursuant to 
these powers it lies within the discretion of the Congress to 
determine the occasions for expansion of our Armed Forces, 
and the means best suited to such expansion should it prove 
necessary. 
(2) An ability to mobilize rapidly is essential to the preserva-
tion of our national security. 
(3) A functioning registration system is a vital part of any mo-
bilization plan. 
(4) Women make an important contribution to our national 
defense, and are volunteering in increasing numbers for our 
armed services. 
(5) Women should not be intentionally or routinely placed in 
combat positions in our military services. 
(6) There is no established military need to include women in 
a selective service system. 
(7) Present manpower deficiencies under the All-Volunteer 
Force are concentrated in the combat arms-infantry, armor, 
combat engineers, field artillery and air defense. 
(8) If mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario, 
the primary manpower need would be for combat 
replacements. 
(9) The need to rotate personnel and the possibility that close 
support units could come under enemy fire also limits the use 
of women in non-combat jobs. 
(10) If the law required women to be drafted in equal numbers 
with men, mobilization would be severely impaired because of 
strains on training facilities and administrative lIystems. 
(11) Under the administration's proposal there is no proposal 
for exemption of mothers of young children. The administra-
tion has given insufficient attention to necessary changes in 
Selective Service rules, such as those governing the induction 
of young mothers, and to the strains on family life that would 
result from the registration and possible induction of women. 
(12) A registration and induction system which excludes wo-
men is constitutional. 
S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODB CONGo 
& AD. NBws 2650-51 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 96-826). 
In concluding that a registration and induction system involv-
ing only male citizens is the best course to insure the country's 
preparedness and its ultimate ability to protect itself, the 
committee was mindful of arguments made by some critics of 
Women's Law Forum 
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Although Congress claimed that it reviewed the issue consti-
tutionally,67 it repeatedly framed the question improperly. In-
stead of asking whether there was substantial justification for 
excluding women from registration, Congress asked whether the 
Constitution required that women be included." 
Rather than examine the issue of women and registration, 
Congress mistakenly focused on women and combat.tII Congress 
justified exclusion because: (1) although historically women have 
defended themselves, they have never been asked to engage in 
aggressive combat,70 (2) sexually mixed military units involve 
unknoWn risks,71 (3) women in combat might affect the national 
resolve in wartime,n (4) there was no military need to draft wo-
men (because a sufficient number of men would be available),71 
(5) military flexibility would be threatened by the inclusion of 
registration that the Constitution requires both men and wo-
men to be treated equally. The argument rests on an interpre-
tation of the principle of equal protection that would mandate 
an equal sharing among men and women of the burden of re-
gistration and conscription. The committee has carefully con-
sidered constitutional arguments raised in detailed statements 
from opponents of a male-only registration and induction sys-
tem. In the committee's view, the arguments for treating men 
and women equally-so compelling in many areas of our na-
tional life-simply cannot overcome the judgment of our mili-
tary leaders and of the Congress itself that a male-only system 
best serves our national security. 
Id. at 159, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2649. 
67. 101 S. Ct. at 2651. 
68. Goldberg V. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. at 596-97; see supra note 11. 
69. S. REP. No. 96-826 supra note 66 at 157, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2647. 
Id. 
The committee remains convinced that registration is vitally 
necessary and that women should not be included in any regis-
tration and induction system. This judgment is based upon 
the committee's assessment of the military needs of the Na-
tion, and its comprehensive study of the registration issue. It 
is also based on the committee's assessment of the societal im-
pact of the registration and possible induction of women. 
70. Goodman, supra note 2, at 260. 
71. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra note 66 at 157, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2647. 
72.1d. 
73. 509 F. Supp. at 599 (Congress' Specific Finding No. '6: "There is no military 
need to include women in a selective service system"). Congress' specific findings are set 
out in full supra note 66. 
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women,74 and (6) registering all women and inducting a token 
number would be an unsatisfactory solution; however, inducting 
all registered women would be administratively impossible.7& 
Congress' list of considerations assumed that registration 
equills the first step of conscription, which eventuates in mobili-
zation-Le., combat----despite the fact that military witnesses de-
fined registration as merely a means by which the pool of availa-
ble young people could be measured.7• The argument that 
registering women would require their inevitable inclusion in 
combat, should the country mobilize, ignores Naval and Air 
Force statutes and Army and Marine Corps policies prohibiting 
women's combat participation.77 Consequently, Congress and the 
military would have to rewrite law and policy before women 
would be allowed into battle. Thus the argument is irrelevant 
and fails to focus on the actual intent and scope of the proposed 
legislation.78 
Congress also reasoned that women would not be excluded 
wholly from military service in any event because they were al-
74. 509 F. Supp. at 598. However, according to the Selective Service System, 72 
countries have military conscription, of which 10 register or conscript both men and wo-
men. rd. at 599 n.1S. 
75. rd. at 598. The committee confused the issue: The numbers of men or women to 
be drafted would always be a decision made by the military. In the proposed legislation 
there was no provision to include equal numbers of men and women if a draft were 
required; there was no provision for any draft specifications. Other administrative 
problems which the committee foresaw included housing and physical standards. As the 
District Court observed, "Women in the military as a group Buffer only about half the 
lost time of men." rd. at 599, n.1S. The height and weight differences between men and 
women are analogous to those between Caucasian and Asian men. Those differences have 
not inhibited excellent performance among Asian men. rd. 
76. rd. at 602. 
77. 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1976) ("women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in 
aircraft that are engaged in combat missions"); 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1976) (female Air Force 
members "may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions"). The 
Army and Marine Corps preclude women from combat by established policy. 101 S. Ct. 
at 2657 (citing J.A. 86, 34, 58). 
78. The District Court summarized the Government's argument as follows: 
[W]omen cannot fill all positions in the armed services, espe-
cially combat positions; in a time of mobilization the primary 
need of the military services will be in combat related posi-
tions and in support position personnel who can readily be 
deployed into combat; therefore, in order to maximize the 
flexibility of personnel management, women should be ex-
cluded from the MSSA. 
rd. at 599-600. 
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lowed to volunteer.'79 This argument begged the issue of whether 
a registration scheme which excluded women unfairly burdened 
men as a class and denied equality of opportunity and responsi-
bility to women.80 
The bias underlying Congress' irrelevant conclusions was 
exposed in a single sentence of the subcommittee report that 
recommended both houses vote to exclude women from regis-
tration because of the "military needs of the Nation. . . . [And] 
the committee's assessment of the societal impact of the regis-
tration and possible induction of women. "81 The committee's 
assessment was purely speculative; nowhere did the committee 
attempt to verify its conclusion. 
Following the introduction of the committee report and rec-
ommendation, Senator Kassebaum81 offered an amendment to 
the proposed MSSA funding allocation which would have pre-
cluded any allocation of funds if the system did not include wo-
men.88 After lengthy debate, the Senate rejected the Kassebaum 
amendment.8• On July 2, 1980, President Carter reinstituted 
military registration to include males only." 
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. 
80. Ct. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1974). In Taylor, a jury system which 
in practice excluded women (who constituted 53% of the eligible jurors oC a community) 
was held unconstitutional even though women could volunteer Cor service by submitting 
a written declaration of desire to serve. 
81. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra note 66, at 157, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2647 (emphasis added). 
82. (R. Kansas). In June, 1980, she was the only female senator. 
83. H.R.J. Res. 521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Pub. L. No. 96-282, 94 Stat. 552 
(1980) was amended to read: 
Provided: That none of the funds made available by this joint 
reaolution shall be available for instituting or taking action to 
drart any individual Cor military service or be used for produc-
tion of any selective service form used for classification which 
does not permit a registrant to have the option of stating that 
such registrant is conscientiously opposed to participation in 
war in any form pursuant to section 6(j) of the Military Selec-
tive Service Act. 
The Kassebaum-Levin amendment would have added the following language arter the 
word "Act": "or shall be made available for implementing a system of registration which 
does not include women." 126 CONGo REC. S6544 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of 
Sen. Nunn). 
84. 126 CONGo REC. S6549 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (40 yeas, 51 nays, 9 abstentions). 
85. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980). 
17
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS OF ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG 
A. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in Goldberg, 
constructed a rationale which is logically flawed, analytically 
confused and generally unpersuasive. He began by declaring that 
the C.ourt must defer to the congressional determination to ex-
clude women from registration, because of what he called a clear 
history of judicial deference in constitutionally mandated ar-
eas.88 The majority argument was skewed because it did not ac-
knowledge the uneven and controversial history of judicial defer-
ence.87 The Court, beginning in the Warren era, had intervened 
when important constitutional issues, especially equal protec-
tion, were at stake,88 a fact which Justice Rehnquist ignored 
when he assembled his line of cases to bolster the majority's def-
erential posture.88 
The Goldberg majority wrote that the judiciary owes partic-
ular deference to Congress in the regulation of military affairs, 
because such decisions demand specific competence and are 
"complex, subtle and professional" in areas of training, equip-
ping and controlling the military force.8o The Court argued that 
Congress is qualified to regulate such affairs, whereas the Court 
is not.81 The majority, however, did not substantiate its position 
that the expertise of Congress exceeds it own-a notable 
omission. 
The deference argument is illustrative of the weakness and 
analytical confusion of the majority opinion. The Court cited 
Gilligan v. Morgan, a free speech case, to establish the Court's 
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-55. 
87. See generally, Gunther, In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Simson, A 
Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 
STAN. L. REv. 663 (1977); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1065 (1969). 
88. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1968). 
89. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-55. 
90. Id. at 2651. 
91. Id. at 2652. But see Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 181, 188 (1962) ("When the authority of the military has such a sweeping capacity 
for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating the military establishment 
as an enclave beyond the reach of civilian courts almost inevitably is drawn into 
question. "). 
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non-competence in military affairs.'a In Gilligan, however, the 
Court limited its deference: "[W]e neither hold nor imply that 
the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial re-
view or that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum 
for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military 
personnel . . . ."81 
While another cited case, Orloff v. Willoughby,94 can be 
read to support the argument that the judiciary lacks compe-
tence to review military decisions, the issue there was at least 
fully reviewed by the Court.1I1 Despite the result, the opinion 
suggests that the Court deferred to Congress because it con-
curred with the result of the case." 
In Parker v. Levy the Army court-martialled a military phy-
sician for disobedience, disloyal and disrespectful remarks made 
to his subordinates, and conduct unbecoming an officer.lI? Al-
though the Court ultimately deferred on a constitutional issue, it 
spent thirty pages discussing the merits of the case. 
These cases weaken the majority's argument that the judici-
ary generally and properly defers to Congress in areas constitu-
tionally encompassing the Congressional prerogative. liS They 
92. 101 S. Ct. at 2652 (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, 10 (1972)). In Gilligan 
the Court held it could not adjudicate charges that the National Guard unnecessarily 
used lethal force to quell campus disturbances, because the Constitution vests such sur-
veillance power in the legislative and executive branches of government. 
93. 413 U.S. I, 11-12 (1972). 
94. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. at 2655 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 
U.S. 83, 94 (1952) ("The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a 
separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judici-
ary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be 
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters,"). 
95. The Court admonished the Government that it properly admitted its responsi-
bility to use professionals in their skilled areas, affirmed that the President was justified 
in refusing a commission to appellant, and removed itself from examining whether Orloff 
should be specially assigned. Orloff'v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87-93 (1952), 
96. "Could this Court, whatever power it might have in the matter, rationally hold 
that the President must, or even ought to, issue the certificate to one who will not answer 
whether he is a member of the Communist Party?" ld. at 91. 
97. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides 
punishment for disobedience, insubordination, improper conduct. Art. 90 (10 U.S.C. § 
890 (2) (1976)) prohibits willful disobedience of a lawful command of a superior commis-
sioned officer; Art. 133 (10 U.S.C. § 933 (1976)) prohibits any disorders and negligences 
which lead to lack of good order and discipline in the armed forces. 
98, See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1968) (invalidating House of Repre-
19
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demonstrate the Court's history of mixed review and deference 
when hearing cases involving the military. 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION AND MILITARY AFFAIRS 
Military cases involving equal protection challenges even 
more persuasively argue against the majority's assertion of def-
erence; in those cases the Court consistently has reviewed the 
equal protection issue. 
In Frontiero99 the Court examined Congress' intent in pass-
ing discriminatory legislation to attract career personnel,l°O cited 
the factors announced in Reed,lOl and held that administrative 
convenience could not withstand the equal protection interest at 
stake.101 The plurality opinion closely examined this country's 
history of sex discrimination108 and recommended that gender-
based classifications be subject to strict scrutiny.l04 
Clearly the Frontiero Court did not view the question as a 
purely military one or as one deserving deference. Instead, it 
scrutinized the governmental purpose, the effect of the statute 
in furthering stereotypical sex roles,lOo and finally invalidated 
the classification as invidious.106 
Although Ballard upheld the Navy provisions which created 
different promotion standards for men and women,10'7 the Bal-
sentatives' denial of seat to Adam Clayton Powell who had been charged with misappro-
priation of public funds). "Our system of government requires that federal courts on 
occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given 
the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may 
cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility." 1d. at 549. 
99. For a brief discussion of Frontiero v. Richardson see supra notes 18-20 and ac-
companying text. 
100. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679 (1972). 
101. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion of the factors outlawed by 
Reed. see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
102. 411 U.S. at 690-91. 
103. 1d. at 684-88. 
104. 1d. at 688. "With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that clas-
sifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage. or national ori-
gin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." 
1d. 
105. 1d. at 688-90. 
106. 1d. at 690-91. 
107. For a discussion of Schlesinger v. Ballard. see supra notes 21-24 and accompa-
nying text. 
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lard Court reviewed the law and recent equal protection case 
historyl08 in reaching its decision. The Court distinguished Bal-
lard from both Frontiero and Reed by finding no overbroad gen-
eralizations in the Navy policy.lo8 The male and female naval 
officers in Ballard were not similarly situated;llo therefore, the 
legislative classification was rational because it compensated wo-
men for reduced career opportunities.lll The Ballard Court also 
determined that administrative convenience was not the basis of 
the law,ll2 and specifically found that the statute served the flow 
of military promotions and reflected current Navy needs.1I8 
Thus, while the Court regards legislative acts most seriously 
and sometimes defers to Congress by acknowledging Congress' 
prerogative in certain constitutional areas, the Court has not al-
ways refused to review military affairs questions and has often 
adjudicated those involving equal protection challenges. In this 
context, it is plain that when Goldberg came before the Court, 
the Court had decided precedent by which to review the equal 
protection argument and deliberately chose not to do so. 
C. THE Goldberg EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
While refusing to label Goldberg either a strictly military 
case or a sex discrimination case, the Court did acknowledge 
that Craig requires the articulation of an important governmen-
tal interest, which the Court identified as "raising and support-
ing armies. "11' There was no proof, however, that registering wo-
men would interfere with the smooth functioning of the military. 
In fact, the opposite was true. m Even assuming the important 
interest was articulated, the Court should have analyzed 
whether a gender-based classification was substantially related 
to raising and supporting armies. Instead, the Court adopted the 
lOS. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 49S, 506-07 (1974). 
109. [d. at 50S. 
110. [d. The Court noted that "[t)he complete rationality of this legislative classifi-
cation is underscored by the fact that in corps where male and female lieutenants are 
similarly situated, Congress has not differentiated between them with respect to tenure." 
[d. at 509. 
111. [d. at 50S. 
112. [d. at 510. 
113. [d. 
114. 101 S. Ct. at 2654. 
115. For a discussion of testimony before congressional subcommittees regarding 
women's roles in the military, see supra notes 59-6S and accompanying text. 
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congressional finding that a male-only registration more effi-
ciently serves national security.u8 
The Court then announced the direction of its analysis: 
When a congressional decision is challenged "on equal protec-
tion grounds, the question a court must decide is not which al-
ternative it would have chosen, had it been the primary deci-
sionmaker, but whether that chosen by Congress denies equal 
protection of the laws."m However, the Court never reviewed 
whether Congress' alternative denied equal protection. Instead 
the Court became bogged down in the issue of judicial deference 
and whether women ought to be put into combat. 
The Court improperly relied on Ballard again, arguing that 
the case best demonstrated the reconciliation achieved between 
Congress and the Court, without noting that intermediate scru-
tiny had been applied there.ll8 The Court also cited Orloff v. 
Willoughby, even though that case had nothing to do with gen-
der-based classifications, and, as has been established already, 
the Court applies a separate standard in military cases which 
involve equal protection challenges.ll8 
The majority was particularly disingenuous in asserting that 
"[w]e cannot ignore Congress' broad authority conferred by the 
Constitution to raise and support armies when we are urged to 
declare unconstitutional its studied choice of one alternative in 
preference to another for furthering that goal. "110 The Court ne-
glected to state the constitutional importance of the "8Iterna-
tive"-equality under the law. And by deferring so thoroughly to 
Congress' findings,lU the Court ignored the obvious inconsis-
116. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. The Court emphasized administrative burdens involved in 
drafting women during mobilization, citing alleged training and housing problems, and 
the detrimental effect on military flexibility. However, the proposed legislation did not 
include mobilization plans and, as the dissent points out, in case of mobilization the 
military would properly determine its immediate needs. Id. at 2673. Furthermore. Con-
gress offered no proof that registering women was detrimental to the smooth operation of 
the military. See supra notes 59-65. 
117. 101 S. Ct. at 2654 (emphasis added). 
118. Id. 
119. For a discussion of the Court's equal protection analysis in military cases see 
supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text. 
120. 101 S. Ct. at 2655. 
121. Such deference had not been the former position of this Court: "This Court 
need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, 
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tency between the congressional findings and the military and 
administration testimony,122 inconsistencies similar to those ex-
pressly rejected in Craig. 
The majority erred just as Congress did by adopting the 
idea that registration means a draft which inevitably results in 
combat123 and that combat restrictions form the basis of the ex-
clusion of women from registration.1I4 However, Congress did 
not determine that drafting women would be harmful to the mil-
itary, only that there was no necessity to draft women. 
Even assuming women would be drawn into combat, the 
Government could not produce any factual studies to support its 
argument that women could not perform well on the battlefield. 
In fact, military studies have shown the opposite.l211 And even if 
women were to be legitimately barred from combat, they could 
fill support positions in the United States and rear areas.lIs 
However, combat was not the issue of the registration statute, 
when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the 
asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation." Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1974). 
122. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text for discussion of subcommittee 
testimony. 
123. 101 S. Ct. at 2657. "Any assessment of the congressional purpose and its chosen 
means must therefore consider the registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time 
of national emergency ... ' . The purpose of registration, therefore, was to prepare for a 
draft of combat troops." [d. 
124. [d. Combat is difficult to define. In military parlance it apparently has no tech-
nical or general meaning. Congress gave the Secretary of Defense six months to submit a 
definition, to which he responded: Combat is "engaging an enemy or being engaged by 
the enemy in an armed conflict;" and a person is "in combat" if "he or she is in a geo-
graphical area designated as a combat/hostile fire zone by the Secretary of Defense 
.... " The Secretary conceded that under this definition women had been in combat in 
combat zones in World War II and earlier. Goodman, supra note 2, at 258. 
125. Goodman, supra note 2, at 255-57. The performance of women was evaluated 
by the Army during 72-hour field exercises in which the percentage of women varied up 
to 35% of total personnel in combat support and combat service support companies. The 
result: The proportion of women had no negative effect on performance. [d. at 256-57 
(citing U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, WO-
MEN CONTENT IN UNITS FORCE DEVELOPMENT TEST (MAX/WAC) (1977)) [hereinafter cited 
as 1977 WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT TEsT). During annual war games in Germany, women's 
performance was studied. In a 30-day sustained combat exercise women "did not impair 
the performance of combat support and combat service support units." Goodman, supra 
note 2, at 257. 
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2668 (citing National Service Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 6569 
before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (testimony of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Ass't Secretary of Defense) 
(unpublished)). 
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and Congress' and the Court's preoccupation with it was extra-
neous, although ultimately conclusive to their respective 
decisions. 117 
The majority asserted that the exemption of women from 
registration was "closely related" to the governmental objec-
tivelSB without having honored a proper equal protection review, 
without acknowledging the clear inconsistencies between con-
gressional testimony and findings, and without establishing a ba-
sis for blatant archaic and overbroad generalizations about wo-
men. The Government did not establish that men and women 
are not similarly situated as to combat, and it did not satisfacto-
rily confront the essential issue of whether men and women are 
similarly situated as to registration. 118 
D. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENT 
Justice Marshall's dissent180 clarified the errors of the ma-
jority opinion: (1) the case presents one question: Whether the 
exclusion of women from the MSSA contravenes the equal pro-
tection component of the fifth amendment, III (2) heightened 
scrutiny must be applied because a purely gender-based classifi-
cation is at issue, 111 and (3) the Government failed to carry the 
burden of showing the substantial relation between the statute's 
discriminatory means and asserted governmental objective. 111 
Additionally, the Court never asked whether some less restric-
tive alternative was available to accomplish the Government's 
purpose. 1M 
127. "The policy precluding the use of women in combat is, in the committee's view, 
the moat important reason for not including women in a registration system." S. REP. 
No. 96·826, supra note 66, at 157, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2647, 
cited in 101 S. Ct. at 2658. 
128. 101 S. Ct. at 2658. "The exemption of women from registration is not only 
sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing their registration, 
since the purpose of registration is to develop a pool of potential combat troops." rd. 
129. "[Tlhe burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly 
discriminates on the basis of BeX to advance an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for 
the challenged classification." Kirchberg V. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (Louisiana 
statute empowering husband to unilaterally alienate property declared unconstitutional 
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.). 
130. 101 S. Ct. at 2662 (which Brennan, J., joined). 
131. rd. 
132. rd. at 2663. 
133. rd. 
134. Ct. Dothard V. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1976) (Title VII prohibits statutory 
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As for the Court's deference, 
One . . . safeguar[ d] of essential liberties is the 
Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection 
of the laws. When, as here, a federal law that clas-
sifies on the basis of gender is challenged as vio-
lating this constitutional guarantee, it is ulti-
mately for. this Court, not Congress, to decide 
whether there exists the constitutionally required 
close and substantial relationship between the 
discriminatory means employed and the asserted 
governmental objective.180 
685 
Justice Marshall's opening and most compelling point, one 
which he regrettably did not elaborate on, was that Congress' 
decision and the majority's affirmation constituted an 
"[i]mprimatur on one of the most potent remaining public ex-
pressions of 'ancient canards about the proper role of 
women.' "186 . 
IV. CRITIQUE: ROSTKER V. GOLDBERG AND APPLICA-
TION OF THE CRAIG TEST 
Rostker v. Goldberg fits logically into the Craig line of cases 
because the exclusion of women from military registration is 
based on a constitutionally sensitive criterion-sex alone. As in 
Weinberger, Craig, and Goldfarb, males based their claim on the 
principle that the. law unfairly burdened them as a class and 
benefitted females.187 The Goldberg factors parallel those in 
height and weight requirements excluding 40% of the female population but only 1 % of 
the male population from job as correctional counselor.). The Court recommended indi-
vidual testing, fairly administered, rather than overbroad classifications, to determine 
physical strength equal to job requirement. [d. at 332. 
135. 101 S. Ct. at 2664. "When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with [a 
constitutional) provisio[n), we have no choice but to enforce the paramount commands 
of the Constitution. We are sworn to do no less." [d. at 2676 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 104 (1958». 
136. 101 S. Ct. at 2662 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J. concurring». 
137. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The District Court 
stated plaintiffs' constitutional argument as follows: 
[TJheir rights to equal protection of the law, as that concept is 
included in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
are violated in that males only are subject to registration for 
the draft, and therefore there is an increased probability of 
the male plaintiffs actually being inducted because the pool of 
draft eligibles is decreased by the exclusion of females. 
[d.; Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
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prior sex-discrimination equal protection challenges: As to mili-
tary registration, males and females were similarly situated but 
treated differently; the classification was based on archaic and 
overbroad generalizations regarding women's roles, and the clas-
sification could not be upheld on the basis of its administrative 
expedience. The difficulty in applying equal protection analysis 
to Goldberg did not center on identifying the important govern-
mental objective. There is no dispute that national security, and 
more particularly the raising of armed forces, is an important 
government objective, although there was no showing that regis-
tering or even drafting women would be detrimental to that in-
terest. The difficulty arose in establishing the substantial relat-
edness between the important governmental objective and the 
gender-based classification.l18 
What the Goldberg majority failed to do-and what is criti-
cal to a proper equal protection analysis-was to inquire beyond 
Congress' specific findings and discover the actual purpose of 
the gender-based classification. lit That necessarily involves scru-
tiny of the legislation's language, history and structure. Given 
the inconsistent conclusions resulting from subcommittee hear-
ings and the congressional findings, the Court had every reason 
to make such an inquiry, which it chose not to do. 
There were factors which made the Goldberg classification 
clearly questionable. Military and Defense Department wit-
nesses testified that the quality of women's contribution to the 
All-Volunteer force equalled, and at times exceeded, men's con-
tributions,140 which underlines the argument that women en-
hance the effectiveness of a military force. Military studies show 
that in field exercises women did not reduce the effectiveness of 
their units. l • l This suggests that stereotypes about women's 
physical weakness and emotional instability cannot be sup-
ported factually. Experiments involving men and women living 
138. For a discussion of the difficulty in correlating the objective sought by a statute 
or rule with classifications which are gender-baaed, see Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 
(1978). 
139. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1086. 
140. For a brief discussion of women's excellent performance in the military, see 
supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
141. For a description of women's performance in field exercises, see supra note 125 
and accompanying text. 
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and working together in close quarters showed no reduction in 
discipline or morale,l42 which suggests that with training and 
proJ:'er management there would be no significant adverse effects 
to mixed units of soldiers. 
Given this unrefuted evidence, it can be concluded that the 
inclusion of women in the military does not reduce military ef-
fectiveness and, by logical extension, that women's exclusion 
from the military cannot be proved to increase military effec-
tiveness. That is the constitutional question: Does the exclusion 
of women as a class promote the important governmental objec-
tive of advancing an effective armed force? The answer clearly is 
that it does not. 
The other proper line of inquiry is whether the congres-
sional basis reflects stereotypical or overbroad generalizations 
about the role of women.148 Case history shows that such classifi-
cations cannot pass constitutional muster.l44 One Senator's re-
marks about women and the family, made during the debate on 
Senator Kassebaum's proposed amendment, suggests that stere-
otypical notions of women's proper place abound in certain gov-
ernmental quarters. l411 
142. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 308·09 (D.D.C. 1978). The Commander of 
the Atlantic Fleet has said commanding officers have "sufficient authority" to deal with 
individuals who have problems adjusting to mixed crews aboard Navy vessels: "Adjust· 
ment and thawing of preciously held barriers to the presence of women and acceptance 
by the male ship's company are social facts of life which must be recognized and dealt 
with." [d. at 309 (citing Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories, Nos. 
37-39 & Attach 7). The Chief of Naval Operations compared adjusting to mixed crews 
with adjusting to mixed dormitories on college campuses: Careful planning is required. 
[d. (citing Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories, Nos. 37·39 & Attach 
7, Third Endorsement on USS Sanctuary, at 6). 
143. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1089·92. 
144. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1974), discussed supra notes 25·32 
(finding irrational a Social Security Act provision which denigrated women's financial 
contributions to family support and was based on "archaic and overbroad" generaliza· 
tions about women); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972), discussed supra notes 
18·20 (Air Force statute which prescribed that male dependents prove their financial 
dependence on their spouses before being eligible for benefits struck down as undermin· 
ing females' developing social roles). • 
145. Maybe I am old fashioned, and I am sure some people will accuse 
me of living in the 18th or 19th century, but I was brought up to 
believe that the basic fundamental unit of Government in this 
country was the family. This country was based on the family unit 
and a belief in God, and a belief in a religious heritage of 
whatever denomination, and that a family was composed of a 
mother and a father and children .... 
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Rostker v. Goldberg, properly analyzed under heightened 
scrutiny, cannot stand. Although Congress' decision complies 
with the first requirement of the test by having an articulable, 
important government objective, its gender-based classification 
cannot be proved to be substantially related to the governmental 
objective. 
I am certainly not here to say that women should not have 
equal job opportunities, equal rights in pay. I agree with all of 
that. But on the basis of equity to say that we are involuntarily 
someday in the future possibly going to take them out of their 
homes, I cannot even conceive of that in the tradition of the 
American family and what it has meant to society . 
. . . I am not about to vote for one more strike against the 
American family and the traditionalism we have known in this 
country. 
How ridiculous can we get when we cannot recognize anymore 
in the popular fad of the time, that we are going to try to have 
unisex and make everybody equal, that we cannot recognize that 
there are basic fundamental physical and biological differences be-
tween men and w9men? 
126 CONGo REC. 86539-40 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Garn). In the same 
debate, 8enator Mark Hatfield offered a reasoned counter-voice: 
Once the combat issue is put in proper perspective and 
the evidence of women's recognized ability to perform military 
functions is asseSBed, it becomes apparent that an exclusion of 
women from a draft registration requirement would be the 
product of the archaic notion that women must remain "as the 
center of home and family." One court apparently recognized 
as much about the Congress which enacted the prior draft law. 
In upholding that law's exclusion of women, the court stated: 
"In providing for involuntary service for men and voluntary 
service for women, Congress followed the teachings of history 
that if a nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of 
defense while women keep the home fires burning." 
At one time judicially accepted, such romantically pater· 
nalistic underpinnings of sex-based classifications are intolera-
ble under current equal protection doctrine. Overbroad gener-
alizations concerning one sex or the other no longer can (sic] 
used to substitute for a functional, gender-neutral means of 
distinguishing between the physically unfit and the able bod-
ied. The paternalistic attitude inherent in exclusion of women 
from past draft registration requirements not only relieved 
women of the burden of military service, it also deprived them 
of one of the hallmarks of citizenship. Until women and men 
share both the rights and the obligations of citizenship, they 
will not be equal. 
Id. at 86548. (remarks of 8en. Hatfield). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Early in the Burger era the Court tried to find a new equal 
protection footing, somewhere between the permissiveness of ra-
tional basis and the rigidity of strict scrutiny. What resulted was 
a fragmentary body of law, sometimes born of poorly elaborated 
rationale, sometimes expediently chosen.148 The questions which 
remain after Goldberg reveal how insubstantial the Court's pro-
gress and independence have been. 
It would go too far, perhaps, to assert that this opinion re-
flects an alarming shift by the Court. More likely the Court, par-
ticularly viewing such regressive legislative trends as the ERA 
backlash currently underway, presumed that a decision which 
would incorporate women in a registration system would wreak 
social havoc. This fear is borne out neither by the popular polls 
taken regarding the ERA (in which a clear majority of Ameri-
cans favored its passage),147 nor in a recent poll conducted by a 
national periodical which shows that a majority of the maga-
zine's female readers favor not only military registration but the 
elimination of the combat exclusion as well.H8 What the male-
dominated Congress and male-dominated Supreme Court more 
probably reflect is the tired delusion that the military-and war 
itself-is a preeminently male world. 
The trenches, combat service in the air, transport 
jobs in advanced positions, and even the other 
less brilliant arenas of activity on the theatre of 
146. See Gunther, supra note 87, at 19. 
147. A Gallup poll of September 1980 showed 64% of Americans favored the ERA; 
Time Magazine's June 1981 poll reported the ERA was (avored 2-1; and an NBC Associ-
ated Press poll in July 1981 showed 71 % favored the amendment. ERA COUNTDOWN 
CAMPAIGN KIT: STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ERA (1981). 
148. (1) Do you think there should be more servicewomen?-Yes: 78%; 
No: 22%. 
(3) Do you think women should be restricted to noncombat 
duties as currently prescribed by law and military policy?-Yes: 
40%; No: 60%. 
(6) Do you think the military is a good career (or a wo-
man?-Yes: 72%; No: 28%. 
(7) Should women be drafted in times of crises?-Yes: 68%; 
No: 32%. 
This is What You Thought About . .. Women's Role in the Military, GLAMOUR, March 
1982, at 33. 
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war, are the last remaining strongholds of men. I 
suspect that men might rather vacate the arena 
altogether than share it with women. Drafting wo-
men for the real work of war-not for the pretty, 
sideline jobs where you can wear giddy uniforms 
and not get dirtied up-would make war much 
less inviting to the males. Of course, once we got a 
serious discussion of such a draft, we should hear 
Chivalry crying out that females are much too 
frail to be subjected to the inhuman cruelties and 
hardships of what is, after all, "a man's game." 
Nonsense! Such a concept of Chivalry is hypocrit-
ical. Already it has blankly averted the men's gaze 
from the women who do so much of the world's 
dirty work-as often as not in the face of discrim-
ination against their seX.141 
Sara MacDwyer 
149. Amelia Earhart, quoted in WOMEN, WAR, AND EqUALITY, supra note 2, at 269. 
See generally P. BRIAND, DAUGHTER 0' THE SKY (1960). 
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